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I. INTRODUCTION
Property interests, unlike contracts, tend to adhere to a limited set of
specific forms—the numerus clausus principle.1 Much scholarship in the
past decade has focused on this distinction in an attempt to understand
both the nature of and the reasons for the limitation on property forms
within the common law.2 While these limitations on form are central to the
common law, equally significant are the temporal limitations embedded
in property law—property interests typically exist for a specific time
period. Even the fee simple, a property interest of supposedly infinite
duration, is limited in time by several overarching rules often referred to
as “rules furthering marketability.”3
Like the numerus clausus principle, these temporal limitations have
been relatively tenacious, limiting the longevity and remote vesting of
property interests for much of the recent history of the common law of
property. The most infamous and controversial of these limitations is the
somewhat quirky rule against perpetuities. But recently, many of these
limitations have begun to disappear. In several discrete but significant
areas of property law, temporal limitations are expanding beyond
recognition or are disappearing altogether, giving rise to more enduring
and, in some cases, more fragmented property interests. So while
limitations on the forms of property interests remain relatively stable,4
limitations on the duration of some property interests are disappearing,
giving rise to a growing number of perpetual property interests.
This Article explores the emergence of longer-lasting property interests
in a number of discrete areas of property law: the longevity of servitudes
in historic and environmental protections, the ever-growing timespan of
intellectual property rights, and the disappearance of the rules against
perpetual interests. While the demise of these and other temporal
limitations deserves recognition itself and will be the focus of a major part
1. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (2000) (“In the common law, the
principle that property rights must conform to certain standardized forms has no name. In the civil
law, which recognizes the doctrine explicitly, it is called the numerus clausus—the number is
closed.”).
2. See Bernard Rudden, Economic Theory v. Property Law: The Numerus Clausus Problem,
in 3 OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 239, 239 (John Eekelaar & John Bell eds., 1987); Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus
Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 373–74 (2002); Michael A. Heller,
The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1166 (1999); Merrill & Smith, supra note
1, at 3.
3. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 240–74 (6th ed. 2006).
4. One exception to this, a relative newcomer to the law of property in the United States,
is affirmative obligations attached to the ownership of land. Rudden, supra note 2, at 242–43.
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of this Article, my primary interest is whether these changes tell us
something about shifting cultural attitudes to our system of private
property. If, as a number of prominent sociologists have argued, an
exploration of social attitudes toward time is indispensable to an
understanding of cultural conditions, then exploring temporal limitations
in property law will presumably help us better understand what Margaret
Radin has called “the Cultural Commitments of Property.”5 The
emergence of potentially longer-running property interests, with their
embedded expectations of stability and permanence, is particularly
compelling, considering that it has occurred at a time when speed,
flexibility, and impermanence are dominant features of our social
conditions. In short, the emergence of perpetual property within the larger
context of the twenty-first century and “time-space compression” is
nothing short of paradoxical.
Part II of this Article begins with a brief exploration of time in
property, from the abstract theories that justify and delineate entitlements,
to the concrete doctrines temporally constraining ownership interests. The
institution of private property, Carol Rose has argued, functions within the
expectations of “an agrarian or a commercial people—a people whose
activities with respect to the objects around them require an unequivocal
delineation of lasting control . . . .”6 The primary contention in this Part is
that the temporal realities in private property are essential to the inherent
conditions and broader social expectations in a commercial or agrarian
society.
Part III addresses the changes in property law affecting temporal
limitations, beginning with those concerning the control of property in the
distant future. Here the two most notable changes are the slow
disappearance of the rule against perpetuities and the rise of perpetual
servitudes in the areas of environmental conservation and historic
preservation. In addition, this Part will look at the increasing longevity of
intellectual property rights. The second half explores the reclamation of
property from the past, in particular the meteoric rise in repatriation
claims. Most of the changes discussed in this Article are based in U.S. law,
but I also draw on material from other common-law jurisdictions with the
expectation of making at least tentative claims about shifts in the cultural
significance of some private property interests within common-law
systems.
Part IV discusses some plausible explanations for the emergence of
perpetual property. It is important to note that there are a variety of diverse
and complex first-order explanations for the changes discussed in this

5. MARGARET J. RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 168 (1993).
6. Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 87 (1985).
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Article—explanations that may have little to do with the temporal
limitations themselves. For example, the disappearance of the rule against
perpetuities is most likely a result of changes to the tax code, and the
increasing length of copyrights is a consequence of a powerful
entertainment industry lobby. And yet in each area, the temporal changes
are intentional and significant. Collectively they pose a phenomenon worth
exploring, particularly given the common law’s traditional abhorrence of
perpetual property interests. Furthermore, considering these changes
together might reveal important underlying shared characteristics
justifying the proposition of an emerging category in which our collective
yearnings for stability manifest themselves in a desire for longer-lasting
interests. In the final analysis, I argue that this increasing collective desire
for permanence—not the supposedly fundamental and absolute nature of
property rights, as others have argued—may help explain a preference for
perpetual interests.7
II. TIME AND PROPERTY
A. General Conceptions of Time in Law
At the most abstract level, the law operates within specific conceptions
of time. Its temporal representations legitimate it as much as its spatial or
territorial limitations—it is both here and now. But just as our cultural
conceptions of time are complicated and contradictory, dependent on both
linear and cyclical representations, so is the law. The “now” is both the
present and all times, at once specific and general.
In her insightful discussion of conceptions of time in the operation of
law, Carol Greenhouse argues that the common law simultaneously draws
on two conceptions of time.8 On the one hand, it “reflects perfectly a logic
of linear time.”9 The law depends on past articulations through the doctrine
of precedent not merely as substantively persuasive legal ideas but as
statements benefitting from time itself.10 Common-law courts depend on
a pervasive “traditionality”11 in decision-making—the past is relevant “for

7. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of
Property, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 694–96 (1986) (exploring the common-law rule of absolute
ownership).
8. See Carol J. Greenhouse, Just in Time: Temporality and the Cultural Legitimation of Law,
98 YALE L.J. 1631, 1631–34 (1989).
9. Id. at 1635–40 (advancing the view that the reception of linear time in the West was the
product of Christianity, but was subsequently secularized in medieval times).
10. See id. at 1640.
11. Martin Krygier, Critical Legal Studies and Social Theory—A Response to Alan Hunt, 7
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 26, 36 (1987).
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its own sake.”12 The circular reasoning is countered by the linear conception
of reform. While constantly embedding itself in the past, law also expresses
itself as an engine of progress. Law as reform, or as a constantly improving
set of ideas, has been a pervasive view since the great reformers of the late
eighteenth century—Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.13 In this way,
law and the legal resolution of disputes string together the past, present, and
future, perfecting representations of linear time.
On the other hand, Greenhouse argues “the common law also involves
larger claims beyond linear time.”14 While its linear representation and
dependence on the possibility of change suggest incompleteness, at any
given moment the common law “represents a totality.”15 Greenhouse
writes:
It is by definition complete, yet its completeness does not
preclude change. It is a human achievement, yet, by its
reversible and lateral excursions, and by its collective voice,
it is not identifiably the product of any particular individual
or group. Symbolically, it stands at the border between the
two great zones of Indo-European thinking—the humanmade . . . and the divine . . . and is nourished by the
indeterminacy of the distinction between events in linear time
and possibilities (all-times).16
It is the representation of these two conceptions of time, Greenhouse
argues, that generates the mythic dimension of law and sets it apart from
other dispute-focused, norm-creating institutions.17 By being both “in
time” and “out of time,” the law is capable of sustaining its mythical status
and its connected claims to neutrality.18
First-year law students in common-law systems know this tension very
well, even if it is rarely acknowledged. They learn in the first weeks of
their legal studies the notion of precedent and stare decisis and the
importance of rationalizing legal opinions by resorting to past decisions,
12. See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1068
(1990) (exploring the importance of the principle of stare decisis and a more general respect for the
past not in terms of utilitarian or deontological considerations but as a pervasive and intrinsic
feature of culture). “It is only on that condition—on the basis of a traditionalism which honors the
past for its own sake—that the world of culture can be sustained.” Id.
13. This view is best captured in Bentham’s critique of Blackstone’s Commentaries: A
Fragment on Government: Being an Examination of What is Delivered on the Subject of
Government in General in the Introduction of Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries (1776).
14. Greenhouse, supra note 8, at 1640.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See id.
18. Id.
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the more prominent the better. But students are also conditioned to present
legal solutions as being “out of time,” as part of a continuous whole that
has, for the most part, always been as it is. Constancy, not change, is the
foundation of persuasive legal arguments. The curious timeless nature of
the common law, its mythical status, is also captured in the declaratory
theory—the idea that judges only find and declare the common law,
merely identifying its true nature, rather than making it up as they go
along. While a strong version of the declaratory theory may be out of
fashion among legal thinkers and judges, the notion that law pre-exists
judicial decision-making still has a place in the common law.19
Greenhouse was writing broadly about the common law and its
legitimation rather than specific substantive areas within the law.20 But we
can borrow her notion of the temporalities of the law to explore specific
substantive areas.21 If, as Greenhouse wrote, the law engages specific
temporal logics to legitimate itself within the larger culture, do specific
areas of law represent their subject matter within a conception of time?22
B. Time and Property
As a subset of the common law, property depends on these broad and
competing conceptions of time. Additionally, property produces and
depends upon specific temporal representations of property itself. So just
as “law—as an idea—carries cultural force because it engages [certain]
temporalities,”23 property law engages specific temporalities as relevant to
its subject matter. At the most abstract level, Carol Rose notes that,
contrary to expectations, traditional theorizing about property almost
inevitably takes “a striking turn toward a narrative or diachronic
explanatory mode where . . . time and cumulative experience play essential
roles.”24 In such accounts, property as an institution is explicable only
through a series of events emerging over time—a “story” in Rose’s
terminology25—rather than as an analytically derived system whose
separate parts are immediately discernible and predictable.
If Rose is right, we can see how theorizing about property has relied on
the same cultural expectation of linearity that Greenhouse suggests is
embedded in the common law. Broadly speaking, an assumption of
progress over time is essential to a diachronic explanation of the institution

See Richard H. S. Tur, Time and Law, 22 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 463, 470–72 (2002).
See Greenhouse, supra note 8.
See id. at 1631.
See id.
Id. at 1650.
CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND
RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 26 (1994).
25. Id.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
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of private property. But equally apparent in Rose’s analysis of the structure
of property theories is the “out of time” element. While many of the most
important figures in the history of property theory must rely on stories to
arrive at an explanation for property rights, the rights themselves are
presented as self-ordained—or natural. Locke’s theory of entitlements, for
example, depends on a series of connected assumptions about the self and
the products of individual effort,26 and in this sense, property emerges like
a moral from a cautionary tale. On the other hand, Margaret Radin notes
that “the temporal dimension is irrelevant to the Lockean theory of
property” because it concerns itself with only the precise moment of
acquisition, ignoring the larger “temporal dimension of human affairs.”27
Both of these observations ring true and are not contradictory, but rather
reinforce Rose’s suggestion that while traditional property theories tend to
rationalize property as a self-evident and timeless institution, they very
much depend on “time and cumulative experience.”28 Thus, property
theory can be seen as an instance of law’s broader mythic
dimension—both embedded in the constant flux of society, while
simultaneously presenting itself as existing for all times.
If we move from the structure of property theories to the theories
themselves, the relevance of time to property becomes even more
apparent. Certainly one of the most ubiquitous concepts in the
establishment of property rights is “first in time”—the first person to
possess the property has priority over all others.29 Robert Sugden argues
that “first come, first served” is a primary convention in both formal and
informal justifications of private property.30 To this we can add the intent
of “lasting control”31 as another central feature of theories about successful
ownership claims. While these concepts are complicated by difficulties in
ascertaining what constitutes firstness or control, the person “first in time”
with an intent to exercise “lasting control” in ways clearly recognizable to
others is more likely to succeed in their property claim. As with the
importance of diachronic explanations for the development of private
property, the ubiquity of first-in-time theories reinforces the importance

26. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 303–04 (P. Laslett rev. ed. 1960)
(1690) (discussing the assumptions involved in ascertaining the derivation of man’s original rights
to property ownership).
27. Margaret Jane Radin, Time, Possession, and Alienation, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 739, 739–40
(1986).
28. See ROSE, supra note 24, at 26.
29. See Epstein, supra note 7, at 669–74 (detailing the importance of the first in possession
or “first come, first served” principle in property law).
30. See ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-OPERATION AND WELFARE 87–97
(1986).
31. See Rose, supra note 6, at 87 (“[T]he common law of first possession . . . require[s] an
unequivocal delineation of lasting control so that those objects can be managed and traded.”).
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of linearity in the creation of cognizable property rights.
At the doctrinal level, property law utilizes culturally determined time
frames to create, limit, and destroy property interests. While the central
concept in the common law of property, the fee simple, is defined as a
temporally unbounded interest, all lesser estates are defined by precise
time limitations—a life, ninety-nine years, a month, etc.32 The fee simple,
an interest of “potentially infinite duration,”33 fits well with and even
encourages a belief in absolute, unfettered property interests, despite the
fact it too is subject to temporal constraints. It reinforces Greenhouse’s
observation that legal interests are represented as being both “in time” and
“out of time.” An absolute right of infinite duration is “out of time,”
lacking clear temporal definition. But just as the notion of absolute
ownership is a myth,34 so too the idea of perpetual ownership has never
been accurate. In other words, while an intent of “lasting control” might
be important in establishing property rights, real control over too long a
period of time can be used to quash those very same interests. Arguably,
this is the whole point of the various “rules furthering marketability.”35
To maintain clarity in ownership and free alienability, various
mechanisms in the common law limit property interests to a specified time
period. The most infamous and direct temporal constraint is the rule
against perpetuities, discussed below. Legislatures have also imposed time
limitations, predominantly through statutes of limitations. Based on little
more than the passage of time, these restraints effectively terminate some
property interests while recognizing others.36 They can be generic, like

32. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *103 (“First, with regard to the quantity of
interest which the tenant has in the tenement, this is measured by its duration and extent. Thus,
either his right of possession is to subsist for an uncertain period, during his own life, or the life of
another man: to determine at his own decease, or to remain to his descendants after him: or it is
circumscribed within a certain number of years, months, or days: or, lastly, it is infinite and
unlimited, being vested in him and his representatives forever.”).
33. HERBERT HOVENKAMP & SHELDON F. KURTZ, THE LAW OF PROPERTY: AN
INTRODUCTORY SURVEY 94 (5th ed. 2001).
34. See Kevin Gray & Susan F. Gray, Private Property and Public Propriety, in PROPERTY
AND THE CONSTITUTION 11, 15 (Janet McLean ed., 1999) (“The ideology of property as
uncontrolled exclusory power is nowadays just as untenable as is the dichotomous distinction
between the domains of the private and the public.”); LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF
PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 2 (2003) (“The idea that property rights—particularly those
involving land—are presumptively free from collective claims has been decisively abandoned, if
ever it was true.”).
35. See Dukeminier, ET AL., supra note 3, at 240–74.
36. While adverse possession has many elements, the most unwavering is the simple passage
of time. For a discussion of the many justifications for adverse possession, many of which hinge
on the passage of time, see Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO.
L.J. 2419, 2471 (2001), which ultimately isolated the endowment effect or loss-aversion theory as
the most plausible justification for adverse possession.
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legislation regarding adverse possession, or specific, like marketable title
acts terminating stale claims37 or limitations on the duration of certain
defeasible interests.38
C. Time and Boundaries
The temporal constraints in property law are consistent with the many
other ways property depends on boundaries. The most significant
“boundary” in property is the limited number of carefully defined interests
that are cognizable and enforceable as property interests—the numerus
clausus principle.39 According to Michael Heller, private property is
circumscribed by a host of rules that attempt to protect against inefficient
arrangements, predominantly commons (“overlapping rights of use in a
commons”)40 and anti-commons (“too many rights of exclusion”).41 Heller
argues that although the various metaphors for conceptualizing
property—particularly the physical thing and bundle of rights
metaphors—have generally obscured the “nuanced way law enforces
property boundaries,” such conceptual boundaries have been pivotal to the
ongoing vitality of private property.42 According to Heller, rules limiting
“intertemporal fragmentation,” such as the rule against perpetuities, are
key examples of such efficiency-producing boundaries.43
While Michael Heller and others firmly ground their observations
c o n c er n i n g t h e n u m e r u s c l a u s u s i n a n e f f i c i e n c y
framework44—specifically the role of law in protecting and encouraging
the productive use of resources—other accounts of private property
recognize the relevance of boundaries in a broader social and cultural
context. At a basic level, Carol Rose argues that physical boundaries, such
as the dilapidated fence that graces the cover of her collection of essays,

37. See, e.g., UNIF. MARKETABLE TITLE ACT , prefatory note (1990) (“The Model Act is
designed to assure a title searcher who has found a chain of title starting with a document at least
30 years old that he need search no further back in the record.”).
38. See, e.g., 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 330/4 § 4 (West 2008) (limiting possibilities of
reverter and rights of entry or re-entry to forty years).
39. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 3–4.
40. Heller, supra note 2, at 1194.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1187–94.
43. Id. at 1176–82. But see Rudden, supra note 2, at 239 (questioning efficiency-based
justifications for the standardization of property interests).
44. Heller focuses on antifragmentation as the key efficiency aspect of the numerus clausus.
See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text. Merrill and Smith on the other hand, focus on the
standardization/efficiency function. See generally Merrill & Smith, supra note 1. Hansmann and
Kraakman, also writing in this area, focus on the verification/efficiency function. See generally
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2.
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are essential to the declaration, “This is mine.”45 But additional acts
expressing a clear and unequivocal intent to exclude others are necessary
to turn such physical boundaries into enforceable legal boundaries. The
success of ownership claims depends on actions that delimit one’s interest
and are easily understood by others. The spatial and temporal contexts for
such actions are key delimiting factors that either support or contradict
ownership claims given certain cultural and societal expectations. So, as
Rose argues, successful claims to ownership depend at least partially on
actions evidencing an intention of long-term commitment rather than a
temporary or itinerant interest, at least within the agrarian and commercial
societies from which our system of private property evolved.46
The point of this is to stress that the timing of our actions with respect
to property is important in determining the validity and extent of property
rights. In addition, how we judge such timing is a product of specific
cultural and societal expectations. Itinerant use might be the basis of a
successful claim to property in some societies, but it is unlikely to support
an ownership claim in traditional common-law societies given their
agricultural and commercial moorings.47 While claims that look too
uncertain are shunned in the common law, so too are claims that appear to
extend beyond the reasonable limitations of individual control. Built into
our system of private property is the expectation that owners will be in
control of and committed to their property, but not beyond that which is
useful in a commercial society.
If we look at this through the lens of time rather than through the
demands of commerce, the traditional common-law regulation of property
is well-suited to the “sheer pace of change” associated with modern
society.48 It elevates rules that encourage flexibility and a quick response
to changing circumstances. In short, given the pace of change, it would be
irrational to allow individuals to retain property interests well into the
future under circumstances that are beyond our ability to predict.
Thus, temporal limitations can be understood and justified based on the
centrality of property to the development of commerce and the general
experience of time in modern society. Clear boundaries, both temporal and
spatial, are key to a system of property rights. If this is the case, then how
should we understand the erosion of these temporal limitations? Does
changing temporal limitations in property reflect changing assumptions

45. See ROSE, supra note 24, at 1.
46. Rose, supra note 6, at 87.
47. Stuart Banner, in his discussion of property law and the colonization of Australia, notes
that “[i]n the late eighteenth century, many believed that a society without agriculture was therefore
a society without property rights in land.” Stuart Banner, Why Terra Nullius? Anthropology and
Property Law in Early Australia, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 95, 102 (2005).
48. ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 6 (1990).
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about the role of property in our society? If these temporal logics are
shifting in some areas, can we take this to be an indication of a larger
cultural or societal shift in expectations about our relationship with some
forms of property interests?
The following Part looks at a number of doctrinal changes in property
law that permit private property holders to control their property further
into the future or to claim property from the distant past. All these changes
suggest a shift in our expectations about the legitimate temporalities of
private property, at least in discrete areas of property law.
III. THE FUTURE AND THE PAST IN OUR PRESENT CONCEPTION OF
PROPERTY
A. Reaching into the Future
The changes discussed below cover three doctrinal areas of property
law. The first two are part of the traditional body of property law—the rule
against perpetuities and servitudes. Changes in both of these areas permit
interested property holders to retain control over their property
perpetually, even though traditionally, the common law guarded against
this outcome. The third change comes from intellectual property law.
Here, the lengthening terms of intellectual property rights—in particular
copyright—raise independent questions while nonetheless sharing the
same temporal peculiarities as the other examples.
1. The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities
Ask any law student about their most unpleasant classroom experience
and chances are she will point to the rule against perpetuities. With its
awkward method of time measurement simultaneously depending on
concrete and abstract concepts, students generally don’t get it. Its focus on
irrational possibilities—fertile octogenarians and unborn widows—rather
than circumstances in real life has earned it the reputation as a trap for
estate planners,49 confounding the plans of those who wish to control their
property into the future.50 But peculiar as it may be, the rule against

49. The Irish Law Reform Commission Report on the question of the abolition of the rule
suggests that the rule acts as a “legal nuisance.” LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT ON THE RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES AND COGNATE RULES (LRC 62-2000) §4.16, at 52 (2000), available at
http://www.lawreform.ie/publications/data/lrc111/lrc_111.pdf [hereinafter LAW REFORM COMM’N
REPORT]. The difficulties associated with the rule against perpetuities are captured in the title of
Barton Leach’s article, Perpetuities: Staying the Slaughter of the Innocents. See W. Barton Leach,
68 L.Q. REV. 35 (1952).
50. But see A.W.B. Simpson, Land Ownership and Economic Freedom, in THE STATE AND
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 13, 37 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1998) (arguing that the primary function
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perpetuities has been around for more than 400 years and is one of the
classic rules of the common law.
The “modern” rule traces back to the Duke of Norfolk’s Case, in which
Lord Nottingham held an estate to be valid so long as it vested, if at all,
during the lifetime of a person now alive.51 From there the rule eventually
became: “No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than
twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest.”52
On the assumption that those who know the rule need no further
explanation and those who do not, want no further explanation, I will not
elaborate on the workings of the rule.53
The rule was crafted to prevent landowners from controlling their
property too far into the future,54 thus limiting “dead hand” control of
property.55 While the rule primarily focused on land, it came to encompass
all interests, real or personal, legal or equitable.56 It “strike[s] a balance
between the wishes of the dead and the desires of the living with respect
to the use of wealth.”57 The justifications for this limitation are frequently
voiced in economic terms.58 Along with a collection of other limiting rules,
the rule against perpetuities came to embody the common law’s support
of the free market. Judge Posner, for example, writes:
Not only are arrangements for the distant future likely to
result in an inefficient use of resources brought about by
unforeseen contingencies; interests that do not vest till
sometime in the distant future may be owned by persons as
yet unascertained or even unborn, making it difficult or
impossible to obtain consent to a transfer.59
of the rule was not to limit the interests of powerful landholders desiring to tie up their property for
generations but rather to ensure a legal mechanism for doing so).
51. 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch. 1681).
52. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (4th ed. 1942).
53. For further discussion of the rule and its many trappings (literally), see generally id., the
classic text discussing the rule.
54. But see Simpson, supra note 50, at 13.
55. See LAW COMM’N, THE RULES AGAINST PERPETUITIES AND EXCESSIVE ACCUMULATIONS
(HC 579, Rep. No. 251), §1.9, at 4 (1998), available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/lc251.pdf
[hereinafter LAW COMM’N REPORT].
56. Id. § 11.1, at 5. The Duke of Norfolk’s Case was itself about a leasehold, an interest
traditionally considered more personal than real property. See supra note 51 and accompanying
text.
57. ROBERT J. LYNN, THE MODERN RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 10 (1966); see also T.P.
Gallanis, The Rule Against Perpetuities and the Law Commission’s Flawed Philosophy, 59(2)
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 284, 284 (2000).
58. E.g., Gallanis, supra note 57, at 284.
59. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 560 (5th ed. 1998). Lord Coke, writing
in the late sixteenth century might have been the first to articulate an efficiency-related justification
for such limiting rules, emphasizing the need for property to be freely alienable. See 3 WILLIAM S.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 85 (5th ed. 1942).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss2/3

12

Harding: Perpetual Property

2009]

PERPETU AL PRO PERTY

297

More recently, Michael Heller states, “[T]he [rule] conclusively presumes
a point after which the social cost of fragmentation exceeds private
gains.”60 While the marketability gains achieved through the rule may both
justify and explain its resilience in the common law, many have observed
that this goal fails to justify its application to trusts.61 Stewart Sterk writes
that “[s]o long as the trustee has power to sell whatever land is held in trust
(or whatever other assets the trust holds), concerns about marketability
disappear.”62
The balance between present and future, presumably achieved through
the rule, is also justified in terms unrelated to efficiency. For example, a
recent UK Law Commission Report emphasized fairness to future
generations as the primary basis for retaining the rule—albeit in a reduced
and reformed state.63 This fairness justification is particularly relevant in
the application of the rule to interests created in beneficiaries under a trust,
given that concerns about the free alienability of property, in that context,
are simply no longer relevant.64
Despite these justifications and its long and infamous career in
common law, the rule looks like it is finally on its way out. Legislative
alterations to the rule’s operation have slowly worn down its sharp edges.65
Most significantly, legislation in some states has altered the peculiar
responses of the rule to remote possibilities by initiating a “wait and see”
approach,66 and simply changing the “perpetuity” term to a fixed eighty or
ninety years.67 The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, for
example, provides that a non-vested property interest will remain valid so

60. Heller, supra note 2, at 1180.
61. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish the Rule Against
Perpetuities: R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097, 2109 (2003).
62. Id.
63. See LAW COMM’N REPORT, supra note 55, § 1.9, at 4–5.
64. HAROLD A. J. FORD & WILLIAM A. LEE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS 34 (3d ed.
1996). But see Sterk, supra note 61, at 2110–117 (arguing that the fairness justification does not
work well when dealing with equitable interests held in trust, but going on to note that the rule
against perpetuities does function to prevent the creation of trusts that would “generate agency costs
and externalities without generating commensurate benefits.”).
65. See, e.g., 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/4 § 4 (West 2008). Illinois legislation provides
a good example of the types of changes that have been enacted. Legislation has been enacted to
deal with the problems of the “fertile octogenarian,” the “unborn widow,” and interests created in
individuals who must comply with an age restriction beyond twenty-one. More generally, it has
limited the harsh application of the rule by implementing a “wait and see” approach. Id.
66. See, e.g., UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 1(a)(2) (1990). For a full list
of the states that have adopted this approach, see Jesse Dukeminier & James Krier, The Rise of the
Perpetual Trust 50 UCLA L.REV. 1303, 1306–07 (2003).
67. Id.; see also RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 71.02(2)–(3) (Michael
Allan Wolf ed., rev. vol. 2008) (discussing the evolution of the rule).
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long as it actually vests or terminates within ninety years.68 Most of these
changes soften the rule, thus allowing more settlements to remain intact.
However, many jurisdictions now limit the rule, or even abolish it
altogether.69 In an article titled The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities,
Or the RAP has no Friends—An Essay, Joel Dobris comments that
“society does not seem to care anymore about perpetuities . . . .”70 Whether
out of disinterest in the regulation of perpetual trusts or perhaps even a
desire for their existence, the primary rule constraining the time frame for
the vesting of future interests has simply slipped out of fashion.
There are good reasons for abolishing the rule—it is antiquated,71
complicated,72 ineffective, harmful, and unfair.73 Many of these arguments
are not new. Strong opposition to continuance of the rule was voiced at
least fifty years ago.74 And yet the movement to abolish it seems to have
picked up steam in just the last few decades. Stewart Sterk argues that the
sudden race between U.S. jurisdictions to abolish the rule, at least as it
applies to trusts, stems from the generation-skipping transfer tax enacted
by Congress in 1986, combined with other changes exposing lawyers to
liability for failure to properly apply the rule.75 Sterk states: “Lawyer selfinterest joined tax avoidance as a reason to abolish the Rule.”76 Even
jurisdictions retaining the rule have nonetheless considerably limited its
application.77 The consequence has been a steep rise in the creation of

68. Id. The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities Act is also incorporated in the
Uniform Probate Code. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-901(a)(2) (1997).
69. For example, the rule has been abolished or severely limited in its operation in Alaska,
Arizona, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 66, at 1313–14. For a full discussion of the legislative changes in
these jurisdictions see id. at 1311–16.
70. Joel C. Dobris, The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities, Or the RAP has no
Friends—An Essay, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601, 603–04 (2000).
71. See Leach, supra note 49, at 39 (“The Rule persists in personifying itself to me as an
elderly female clothed in the dress of a bygone period . . . .”).
72. See Dobris, supra note 70, at 656.
73. See LAW REFORM COMM’N REPORT, supra note 49, §§ 4.14–.19, at 51–53 (discussing all
of these objections, and more).
74. Leach, supra note 49, at 35–59 (discussing problems inherent with the Rule as it existed
in 1952 and suggesting solutions); see also Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 66, at 1304–11
(discussing the extended campaign to abolish or reform the rule).
75. Sterk, supra note 61, at 2097.
76. Id. at 2101; see also Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Perpetuities or Taxes?
Explaining the Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2465, 2478 (2006) (pointing to the
passage of the generation skipping transfer tax as the primary catalyst for the rise of perpetual trusts
and the liberalization of perpetuities rules: “Considerable evidence supports the view that the GST
tax sparked demand for perpetual trusts by giving trust duration greater salience in estate
planning”).
77. Sterk, supra note 61, at 2102.
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perpetual trusts. The late Jesse Dukeminier reported that the “number of
perpetual trusts created nationwide now runs into the thousands per
year.”78
The rule’s recent history in the United Kingdom is instructive. The
rule’s “complexity and harshness” prompted a first round of reforms in
The Perpetuities and Accumulations Act of 1964.79 The most significant
reform from that Act was the adoption of a “wait and see” approach.80
More recently, the Law Commission suggested another set of reforms,
most significantly limiting the rule to “successive estates and interests in
property . . . [and] to powers of appointment,” leaving such rights as
options and rights of pre-emption untouched by the rule.81 Additionally,
the Law Commission proposed that the perpetuity period be replaced with
a fixed 125-year term.82 While it is plausible to argue that this and other
fixed-term amendments to the rule actually shorten the required time
frame for remote vesting, it is equally plausible to argue that they are
longer than a “life in being plus twenty-one years.” Furthermore, a “wait
and see” provision typically accompanies a fixed term amendment, leaving
the final disposition of remote interests unsettled for a longer period of
time.
It is worth noting that the rule’s “death” is only the latest in a long
drawn out eradication of rules designed to limit the creation of non-vested
future interests. In the introduction to his classic treatise on the rule, John
Chipman Gray remarked, “originally the common law subjected [the
creation of future interests] to many restrictions, but that these restrictions
have been gradually so far removed that the rule against perpetuities is
now almost the only legal check upon the granting of future interests.”83
If the rule is indeed the last significant barrier to the remote vesting of
future interests, one must wonder why we aren’t more concerned about its
slow disappearance.
2. Servitudes in Perpetuity
One of the most dramatic shifts in property law in the past fifty years
has been the influence of environmental concerns. Where development

78. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 66, at 1316.
79. See LAW COMM’N REPORT, supra note 55, § 2.8, at 14–15.
80. For a summary of this and other changes, see id. § 2.13, at 15.
81. See id. § 11.2, at 132. The UK Government accepted the report but has yet to pass
legislation implementing its objectives. See LAW COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 2007–08 (HC 540,
Rep. No. 310), §§ 3.32–.33, at 18 (2008), available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/lc310_web.
pdf.
82. Id. § 11.7, at 133.
83. GRAY, supra note 52, § 4. Some of the other rules are the destructibility of contingent
remainders and the merger rule.
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was once allowed to proceed regardless of environmental impact,
environmental regulations now heavily limit the extent and conditions of
property development. One need look no further than the growing body of
U.S. Supreme Court cases dealing with what forms of regulation constitute
“takings” of property to see the impact of such regulations on land use.
Many regulatory takings cases relate to some form of environmental
regulation.84
Given the constitutional difficulties created by environmental
regulation, it is no wonder that one of the most important developments
has been the conservation easement.85 Julia Mahoney notes that the
number of acres protected by conservation easements “increased from
450,000 in 1990 to 2.6 million in 2000.”86 By the end of 2005 that number
increased to more than 6.2 million acres.87 As a private-property88-based
mechanism for the conservation of property, many have sung the praises
of this relative newcomer to the property scene.89
While it has been around for almost a century, the conservation
easement has only recently become a significant tool in conservation and
has developed largely outside the common law.90 The common law, in
fact, jealously guarded against the adoption of new negative easements.
The conservation easement was particularly problematic because the

84. See, e.g., Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 306 (2002) (involving the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency Ordinances); Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1006–07 (1992) (involving the South Carolina Beachfront
Management Act).
85. For a general definition of a conservation easement (or servitude) see RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.6 (1) (2000) (“A conservation servitude is a servitude created
for conservation or preservation purposes. Conservation purposes include retaining or protecting
the natural, scenic, or open-space value of land, assuring the availability of land for agricultural,
forest, recreational, or open-space use, protecting natural resources, including plant and wildlife
habitats and ecosystems, and maintaining or enhancing air or water quality or supply.”).
86. Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the Future, 88 VA.
L. REV. 739, 742 (2002).
87. See LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, 2005 NATIONAL LAND TRUST CENSUS REPORT 5 (2005),
available at http://www.landtrustalliance.org/about-us/land-trust-census/2005-report.pdf; see also
Nancy A. McLaughlin, Conservation Easements: Perpetuity and Beyond, 34 ECOLOLOGY L.Q. 673,
675 n.8 (2007) (noting that the number of acres covered by conservation easements is even higher
once one factors in land trusts that operate on a national level, such as the nature conservancy).
88. However, some have questioned the extent to which it is really private, given its
dependence on public incentives. See Leigh Raymond & Sally K. Fairfax, The “Shift to
Privatization” in Land Conservation: A Cautionary Essay, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 599, 626–28
(2002).
89. See Mahoney, supra note 86, at 742–43 (noting that conservation easements have a
significant list of supporters and few critics).
90. But see Bennett v. Comm’r of Food & Agric., 576 N.E.2d 1365, 1367–68 (Mass. 1991)
(declaring validity of an agricultural-preserve easement at common law on the basis that it is in
furtherance of an important stated legislative goal).
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benefit was typically held in gross.91 The common law blocked the growth
of negative easements because they are not readily apparent, unlike the
typical affirmative easement, with its clearly marked intrusion on the
burdened property.92 While the law of equitable servitudes, particularly in
the United States, has ushered in an expansion in the range of such
restrictions,93 such servitudes are generally subject to a host of complicated
requirements, not making them the most user-friendly form of property
restriction.
Given the common law’s suspicion of new non-possessory interests
and dead hand control over property, conservationists turned to legislatures
to establish the conservation easement. In 1981, the Uniform Conservation
Easement Act was approved. Since then, more than forty states have
passed legislation largely based on it, thus permitting the creation and
subsequent enforcement of conservation easements.94 Comparable
interests, usually under the name conservation covenants, have also
emerged in New Zealand,95 Australia,96 and Canada.97
The merits of conservation easements are not the focus of this
commentary. Rather, what interests me is the latitude granted to property
owners choosing to restrict their property through conservation easements.

91. Andrew Dana & Michael Ramsey, Conservation Easements and the Common Law, 8
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 2, 12–14 (1989).
92. See Mahoney, supra note 86, at 749 (noting that early attempts by the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service to obtain nonpossessory interests in land as a conservation tool were only
marginally successful because subsequent property owners were able to claim under the common
law that the restrictions were not binding beyond the contracting parties); see also Phipps v. Pears,
[1964] 1 A.C. 76, 83 (Q.B.) (stating that “[t]he law has been very chary of creating any new
negative easements”).
93. The most important addition is the recognition of covenants or servitudes imposing
affirmative obligations on the burdened property holder, such as monetary payments. See Rudden,
supra note 2, at 242–43.
94. Mahoney, supra note 86, at 750.
95. The Queen Elizabeth the Second National Trust Act 1977 provides for the creation of
“Open space covenants.” See Queen Elizabeth the Second National Trust Act 1977, § 22, 1977
S.N.Z. No. 102 (N.Z.), available at http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1977/0102/latest/
whole.html?search=sw_096be8ed8009c727_legal+agreement+between+the+National+Trust+an
d+a+landowner#DLM8803; see also QEII National Trust: Open Space New Zealand, Covenants,
http://www.openspace.org.nz/Site/Covenants/default.aspx#60213-1 (last visited Feb. 22, 2009)
(explaining that a covenant is defined as a legally binding protection agreement between the
National Trust and a landowner, protecting privately owned open space, that covenants are
registered against the title and are binding on all current and subsequent owners or leaseholders,
and that “[o]pen space covenants are generally in perpetuity” (emphasis added)).
96. See, e.g., Victorian Conservation Trust Act, 1972, § 3A (Austl.) (providing for the
creation of a “conservation covenant” to be held by the Trust); Soil and Land Conservation Act,
1945 § 30B (W. Austl.); National Parks and Wildlife Act, 1970 § 37B (Tas.).
97. Conservation Land Act, R.S.O. ch. C 28 (1990); Land Title Act, R.S.B.C. ch. 219 § 215
(1979).
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As with the disappearance of the rule against perpetuities, these servitudes
provide current owners with unprecedented powers to affect the
management of their property indefinitely.
While all servitudes have the potential to run in perpetuity,
conservation easements are permanent by design and many statutes that
facilitate their creation actually require that they be perpetual.98 It is this
permanence, along with significant tax advantages,99 that makes them both
unique and highly desirable. And while the collection of common-law
remedies designed to remove or terminate servitudes are technically still
available, the terms of the legislation, as well as the nature of the easement
itself, render such remedies ineffective. For example, the doctrine of
changed circumstances is designed to permit the termination of an
easement should it no longer be suitable given changes in the surrounding
neighborhood. Applying this doctrine to conservation easements is
problematic because changes to the surrounding environment are
themselves reasons for the existence of the easement. Julia Mahoney
states, “Changed conditions of the neighboring land renders enforcement
of the servitude all the more important because the burdened parcel
represents the final vestige of the old landscape.”100 So we are left with a
situation in which the servitude is explicitly defined as being permanent,
the conditions for removal are very limited, and the beneficiary of the
easement, typically a non-profit conservation organization or a
government agency, has no real incentive to consent to termination.101
The conservation easement’s popularity emerged in tandem with a
comparable development in the area of historic preservation. Here,
permanent easements, again granted to non-profit or government heritage
organizations such as the Illinois Landmark Commission, are granted to
ensure the preservation of privately owned property. The recent
Restatement covering servitudes and the Uniform Conservation Easement
Act include preservation or heritage-based restrictions in their definitions.
The Restatement defines preservation purposes as including “preserving
the historical, architectural, archaeological, or cultural aspects of real
property.”102 As with the conservation easement, the historic preservation
easement is intended to last in perpetuity or so long as its intended purpose
98. See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 815.2(b) (1990) (West 2008) (establishing conservation
easements as perpetual in duration).
99. McLaughlin, supra note 87, at 688.
100. Mahoney, supra note 86, at 778.
101. For a spirited discussion of the permanence of conservation easements and the problems
generated by this dead hand control, see id. at 777–79. See also McLaughlin, supra note 87, at
706–07 (arguing for a more cautious use of the perpetual conservation easement given the longterm difficulties it poses).
102. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.6 (2000); see Bagley v. Found. for
Pres. of Historic Georgetown, 647 A.2d 1110, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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can be met.
The popularity of preservation and conservation easements is part of
a larger trend embracing servitudes. As gated communities and
condominium developments expand,103 the complex web of covenants
controlling property thickens. These restrictions often have no definite end
date. Yet, it is important to distinguish them from conservation and
heritage-related easements precisely because the latter forms of restrictions
are specifically designed to run in perpetuity with only marginal prospects
of termination.
3. Perpetual Rights in Knowledge and Ideas
Perhaps the most interesting example of the temporal extension of
property interests is the increasing time frame for intellectual property
rights. Since World War II, there has been a huge expansion in intellectual
property rights leading to what John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos have
labelled the “biogopolies” and “infogopolies” of the twenty-first
century.104 These sanctioned monopolies, with their lock on a vast array of
knowledge, are at the forefront of the global economy, and they continue
to expand through the international rules established under the TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement.105 While the
expansion of patents and copyrights into new areas of knowledge106 and
information107 has been central to the growing importance of intellectual
property rights, the time expansion is no less remarkable.
The most significant changes to the temporal boundaries of intellectual
property rights are in the area of copyright. The recent court battle in the
United States over the Copyright Term Extension Act108 put the question

103. One-sixth of the U.S. population now lives in gated communities and condominiums.
America’s New Utopias, ECONOMIST, Sept. 1, 2001, at 25.
104. PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 150, 169 (New Press 2003) (2002).
105. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay
Round): Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in
Counterfeit Goods, Apr. 15, 1993, at 83–84, reprinted in 33 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 81 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
106. In patent law, the steady shift from a focus on mechanical processes to biotechnology and
more recently genetic engineering has fundamentally altered patent law and exponentially increased
the number of existing patents. See DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 104, at 150–68.
107. While the expansion in copyright is less dramatic, the extension of copyright to computer
technology, particularly software, has had a significant impact on the role of copyright in
controlling information. See id. at 169–86. See generally Lawrence Lessig, The Creative Commons,
55 FLA. L. REV. 763 (2003) (arguing that copyright controls unduly hinder the free transfer of
information).
108. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102, 112 Stat. 2827
(1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006)) [hereinafter CTEA]. The CTEA was the
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of the appropriate time frame for copyright directly before the U.S.
Supreme Court.109 While perpetual copyright protection would indeed
violate the Constitutional requirement that exclusive rights be “for limited
[t]imes,”110 the majority found that the term established in the CTEA was
not perpetual, and that the appropriate non-perpetual term was a matter for
Congress to decide.111 Writing in dissent, Justice Breyer expressed concern
that the most recent extension “make[s] the copyright term not limited, but
virtually perpetual.”112 Later in his opinion he suggested that the new
copyright term would, if the vesting of property were in issue, “violate the
traditional rule against perpetuities.”113
Aside from the question of constitutionality, the trend here is
obvious—in the past thirty years, the copyright term has moved from a
maximum of fifty-six years114 to an average of ninety-five years,115
creating what Peter Jaszi refers to as perpetual copyright “on the
installment plan.”116 From an economic standpoint, the current copyright
term “has nearly the same present value as an infinite copyright term.”117
fourth such extension in U.S. legislative history. The initial copyright term established in 1790 was
fourteen years from publication, renewable for another fourteen years.
109. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 192–94 (2003) (upholding the constitutionality of the
CTEA, which extended the duration of copyrights by another twenty years).
110. U.S. CONST. Art I, § 8, cl. 8. Congress shall have power “[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” Id. While there was some debate in English law about
the existence of common-law perpetual copyright, this view did not appear to take root in the
United States. The Continental Congress had no power to regulate in this area and most states
simply embraced the English limitations set forth in the Statute of Anne: “No state was disposed
to view copyright as creating a perpetual property right.” Edward C. Walterscheid, Defining the
Patent and Copyright Term: Term Limits and the Intellectual Property Clause, 7 J. INTELL. PROP.
L. 315, 349 (2000). And later stated, “[w]hat is clear is that both Pickney and Madison did not want
a perpetual copyright term but rather wanted something along the lines set forth in the Statute of
Anne, that is to say, a limited term.” Id. at 353.
111. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193–94.
112. Id. at 254 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
113. See id. at 256–57.
114. The term of twenty-eight years from the date of publication, renewable for another
twenty-eight years was established in 1909 and remained in place until 1976. See Act of Mar. 4,
1909, ch. 320, §§ 23-24, 35 Stat. 1080–81.
115. The new term established under the CTEA begins at creation and runs until seventy years
after the author’s death, or ninety-five years after publication for a work of corporate authorship.
17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006).
116. Peter Jaszi, Caught in the Net of Copyright, 75 OR. L. REV. 299, 303 (1996) (quoting his
own testimony in The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearings on S. 483 Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 24 (1995)).
117. Brief for Eldred et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Eldred v. Ahscroft, 537
U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), 2002 WL 1041846 (arguing that extending the copyright term
increases the social cost of monopoly). For an economic argument in favor of indefinitely
renewable copyright, see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable
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In other areas of intellectual property, time extensions have not been
as dramatic. In the area of patents, changes in U.S. law have extended the
patent term, but only marginally. The original patent term was fourteen
years118 and today it reaches up to twenty years, consistent with TRIPS.119
Because of TRIPS, the same twenty-year term is now standard in many
jurisdictions. But large corporate patent holders, particularly
pharmaceutical companies, engage in a number of tactics designed to
further lengthen patent rights.120 Some of these have met with moderate
success, while others are typically prevented if caught. Most blatant of
these is simply double patenting—successfully applying for another patent
once the first term has expired.121 In the United States, this trick was dealt
a decisive, albeit needlessly complex, blow in the termination of Eli Lilly’s
second Prozac patent.122 The other more successful extension tactic is the
“evergreening” of patents, a technique whereby pharmaceutical companies
succeed in patenting new formulations and applications of a drug.123
Other intellectual property interests are typically less constrained by
specific terms. Trademarks, for example, are infinitely renewable provided
they remain in use—indeed, they have always been potentially

Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 474–75 (2003). See also Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time,
50 UCLA L. REV. 775, 778 (2003) (also arguing that the length of the copyright term might not be
problematic if fair use and other public access rights are strengthened over time); Joseph P. Liu,
Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 410 (2002) (same).
118. The fourteen-year term established in the 1790 Patent Act derived from the English
Statute of Monopolies. See Adam J. Sedia, Storming the Last Bastion: The Patent Reform Act of
2007 and Its Assault on the Superior First-to-Invent Rule, 18 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH., & INTELL.
PROP. L. 79, 82 (2007). This term lasted until the Patent Act of 1861 when a seventeen-year term
was adopted. See Tyler T. Ochoa, Patent and Copyright Term Extension and the Constitution: A
Historical Perspective, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 19, 53 (2001). It wasn’t until 1995 that this
term was extended to twenty years to bring the law in line with TRIPS. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2)
(2006).
119. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 105, art. 33.
120. See generally Lara J. Glasgow, Stretching the Limits of Intellectual Property Rights: Has
the Pharmaceutical Industry Gone Too Far?, 41 IDEA 227 (2001) (analyzing how pharmaceutical
companies lengthen patent life to obtain an exclusive market share). In some jurisdictions,
pharmaceuticals also have a five-year extension of the standard twenty-year term. See Patricia J.
Carter, Federal Regulation in the United States and Canada, 21 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
215, 243 (1999).
121. See DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 104 at 161.
122. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 971–72 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For a
comment on the complexities of this case see Hsin Pai, Comment, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs.,
Inc.: The Muddling of Obviousness Type Double Patenting Doctrine, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 479, 491
(2002).
123. See Glasgow, supra note 120, at 234 (discussing the extension of the Augmentin patent);
All Things Considered (NPR radio broadcast Nov. 28, 2000); see also David Pilling & Richard
Wolffe, Drug Abuses, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 20, 2000, at 20 (referring to these as “submarine
patents”).
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perpetual.124 But again other changes within trademark law have made
perpetual trademarks more of a reality. The growing significance of a
“dilution rationale” for trademarks and the passage of anti-dilution statutes
have given expanded scope to the notion of use.125 The enforceability of
a trademark now depends more on the proprietary interests of the mark
holder, “the business reputation or . . . the distinctive quality of a mark,”
than the regulation of competition and the interests of consumers.126 With
the switch away from consumers’ interests to the mark holder’s interest
comes the possibility of longer, more powerful and wide-reaching
trademarks.127
While these changes do not create perpetual intellectual property rights,
they illustrate a trend toward the lengthening of intellectual property
rights, particularly in the area of copyright. Unlike the prior examples
where property interests are fragmented over time, intellectual property
interests are monopolistic and thus enable long-term exclusive control. As
a consequence, the economic and societal effects of even a limited
lengthening are likely to be significant.
B. Retreating to the Past
While the above examples indicate that in some discrete areas of
property law property owners are increasingly able to control their
property further into the future, they can also reach further into the past to
reclaim property. In the first example below, dealing with the revival of
customary rights, groups have retained rights to use privately held or
otherwise inaccessible property based on usage for “time immemorial.” In
the second example below, prior owners are able to circumvent otherwise
applicable limitation periods to claim important cultural objects.
1. “Usage for Time Immemorial”—Customary Rights
While the concept of customary rights has always held a cherished
place in English law,128 most commentators agree that “[u]ntil recently,
one could fairly characterize the United States judicial reception to custom
as a source of law as decidedly chilly.”129 So among the many changes in
124. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 105, art. 18 (“The registration of a trademark shall be
renewable indefinitely.”).
125. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (West 2008); Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L.
No. 104-98, § 3, 109 Stat. 985, 985 (1995).
126. See ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES 70–71
(1998).
127. See id. at 71.
128. See David L. Callies, Custom and Public Trust: Background Principles of State Property
Law?, ALI-ABA 699, 705 (1999).
129. See id. at 703.
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property law running contrary to the common law’s abhorrence of
perpetuities,130 the strangest must be the limited revitalization of the
doctrine of custom in establishing public access to private property.
Customary rights in common-law jurisdictions have their origins, like
so many other property doctrines, in England’s manorial and feudal
system. Rights claimed by a manor’s tenants were recognized so long as
the tenants could prove that the custom in question ran as far back into
time as anyone could remember and was reasonable.131 What makes the
doctrine of custom particularly interesting for the purposes of this Article
is that it recognizes an inalienable, unending interest in affected properties,
held by a specific, clearly identifiable segment of the public, and that it
justifies such interest based on usage for as long as the memory stretches.
In this sense, it depends on recognition running back in time and then
enforces the rights in question indefinitely into the future. John Chipman
Gray remarked, “[I]t should be remembered that [customary rights] cannot
be released, for no inhabitant, or body of inhabitants, is entitled to speak
for future inhabitants. Such rights form perpetuities of the most
objectionable character.”132
Aside from a general aversion to perpetual interests, customary rights
were spurned in American law because of the factual requirement that the
custom be traced back to time “immemorial.” This concept has little place
in a nation where European colonization and the reception of the common
law are well within recorded public and legal memory.133 The uncertainty
that customary rights create for settled common-law private property
interests provides yet an additional reason for rejecting them.134
Nonetheless, some U.S. jurisdictions have recognized customary
rights.135 In 1969, an Oregon court relied on customary rights to recognize
a public right of access to the dry sand area of private beachfront
property.136 The court stated: “It seems particularly appropriate in the case
at the bar to look to an ancient and accepted custom in this state as the
source of a rule of law.”137 To support the idea of usage for time

130. “[F]or courts of justice will not indulge even wills, so as to create a perpetuity, which the
law abhors: because by perpetuities . . . estates are made incapable of answering those ends of
social commerce, and providing for the sudden contingencies of private life, for which property was
at first established.” WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *173–74.
131. See ROSE, supra note 24, at 123.
132. GRAY, supra note 52, § 586.
133. See, e.g., Ocean Beach Ass. v. Brinley, 34 N.J. Eq. 438, *6 (N.J. Ch. 1881); Harris v.
Carson, 34 Va. (7 Leigh) 632, *3 (1836).
134. Ackerman v. Shelp, 8 N.J.L. 125, 130–31 (N.J. 1825).
135. See generally Knowles v. Dow, 22 N.H. 387 (1859) (recognizing the existence of
customary rights in New Hampshire).
136. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 678 (Or. 1969).
137. Id. at 678.
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immemorial, the court even alluded to Native American use of the dry
sand area long before European colonization.138
Other American courts have rejected the notion of custom as an
“[a]rchaic judicial response[,]” relying instead on the less “‘fixed or
static’” concept of “public trust.”139 Interests held under the public-trust
doctrine may also run indefinitely and thus can be seen as part of the rise
of perpetual interests, although in a more limited way. Property interests
held through the concept of public trust depend on proof of public need,
whereas the doctrine of custom primarily depends on continuity in the
mere recognition of the rights in question.140 Property interests determined
by public need are more changeable than those driven by mere public
recognition. Nonetheless, the key advantage of both these approaches is
that they steer clear of the constitutional requirement of compensation for
a “taking” of property because the public interest is presumed to have been
there all along. Private property owners lose nothing—a right to exclude
the public was never there to begin with.141
Perhaps because of their ancient status and their strange contradiction
of common-law property rights, customary rights have also caught on in
Hawaii. Native Hawaiians have used them as the basis for a variety of
claims stemming from their traditional practices. For most of its history as
a state, the customary rights of native Hawaiians were thought to be
terminated by statute. But in 1995, the Supreme Court of Hawaii made it
clear that such rights may trump common-law rights of exclusion.142
138. Id. at 673.
139. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365, 369 (N.J. 1984) (holding
that the dry sand area of a beach owned by a quasi-public body was open to the public through the
public trust doctrine). The public trust doctrine as it applies to beaches, tidal, and submerged lands
itself has a long history stretching back at least to the seventeenth century and Matthew Hale’s
treatise, De Jure Maris. Within the United States, it has experienced surges of popularity since the
early nineteenth century. See ROSE, supra note 24, at 115–16. The modern articulation and
application of the doctrine is typically traced to Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970) (examining
the modern use of the public trust doctrine in various jurisdictions throughout the country). A brief
history of the legal recognition of public interest in tidal and submerged lands is also contained in
Matthews, 471 A.2d at 360–62.
140. See Callies, supra note 128, at 732 (citing Blackstone for the proposition that it is the
right of use, not the use itself, that must be proven).
141. This is a particularly convenient method of avoiding the possibility of compensation in
the wake of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, given its stated exception for states’
“background principles of the State’s law of property.” 505 U.S. 1003, 1020–32 (1992). However
Justice Scalia, the author of the Lucas opinion, has rejected the notion that such “new-found”
doctrines are part of the “background principles.” Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 835 P.2d 940,
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1332, 1334–35 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). For a discussion of whether
customary rights are part of such “background principles” see Callies, supra note 128, at 703–05.
142. Pub. Access Shoreline Haw. v. Haw. County Planning Comm’n, 903 P.2d. 1246, 1263
(Haw. 1995). But see State v. Hanapi, 970 P.2d 485, 494–95 (Haw. 1998) (doubting the
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Australian Aborigines and the Maoris of New Zealand have also
resorted to the notion of customary rights as a means of protecting their
traditional practices and ensuring access to private lands.143 Unlike the
European populations that colonized these nations, the indigenous
populations can indeed trace their usage back to time “immemorial.”144
Furthermore, the doctrine was intended to apply to only specific
communities and discrete practices, making it peculiarly apposite to the
situations of indigenous peoples. Consequently, customary rights have
been widely used outside the United States as a tool for recognizing
aboriginal rights.145
There are a number of plausible explanations for why customary rights
have reappeared in case law. In the context of beach access, customary
rights can establish public access over a large area and against an entire
category of property owners without running afoul of the constitutional
requirement of just compensation.146 In the area of aboriginal rights, the
suitability of customary rights to the indigenous populations living within
legal systems that offer them few other remedies goes a long way to
explain their popularity.147 But regardless of the explanation, it is evident
that customary rights have arisen “phoenix-like”148 from the remains of
English property law, providing yet another example of property interests
running in perpetuity.
2. Stolen Cultural Objects and the Irrelevance of
Limitation Periods
The restitution of personal property within the common law has always
turned on an applicable limitation period. While neither a thief nor a
subsequent good-faith purchaser can acquire good title to stolen objects,
the passage of a statutory time period—typically anywhere from two to six
years in U.S. jurisdictions—bars the original owner from claiming the
property in question, at least against a good-faith purchaser.149
applicability of customary rights to settled residential property).
143. The Australian case law is probably the most extensive on the issue of customary rights
and “native title.” See generally Mabo v. Queensland II (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, 61–65. More recently
the Australian High Court has begun to limit the rights associated with “native title.” See Yorta
Yorta Aboriginal Cmty. v. Victoria, (2002) 214 C.L.R 422, 422–23.
144. Yorta Yorta, 214 C.L.R at 492.
145. See Kent McNeil, The Relevance of Traditional Laws and Customs to the Existence and
Content of Native Title at Common Law, in EMERGING JUSTICE? ESSAYS ON INDIGENOUS RIGHTS
IN CANADA AND AUSTRALIA 416 (Kent McNeil ed., 2001); see also, Kent McNeil, Self-Government
and the Inalienability of Aboriginal Title, 47 MCGILL L.J. 473, 506–07 (2002).
146. Callies, supra note 128, at 736–37.
147. Id. at 730.
148. Id.
149. See Patty Gerstenblith, The Adverse Possession of Personal Property, 37 BUFF. L. REV.
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Consequently, a good-faith purchaser of personal property typically feels
secure about her title after the statutory time period for recovery has
expired. This, however, is no longer the case when dealing with significant
works of art or other cultural objects. Now, owners can reclaim such
objects long after the relevant time period passes.150
Changes in this area are related to two larger social and historical
concerns. The first is the Nazi theft and illegal transfer of a significant
portion of Europe’s artistic treasures.151 Given the scale of Nazi looting
and the broader context of the Holocaust, it is not surprising that the
standard adverse possession approach was unsuitable.152 The first case to
deal with this issue in the United States concerned the ownership of a
Chagall painting left behind in Belgium as the owners fled from the
advancing Nazis.153 The relevant New York statutory time period had long
since expired, but the court permitted the plaintiff to sue for the return of
the painting by applying what is now known as the “demand and refusal”
rule.154 Under this rule, the cause of action does not accrue, and thus the
limitation period does not begin to run, until the original owner demands
return and the defendant refuses.155 While subsequent cases raised doubts
about the continued application of this rule, the New York Court of
Appeals eventually affirmed it in Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation v.
Lubell,156 a case involving another Chagall.157
Other courts dealing with ownership disputes over stolen or missing art
followed New York’s lead and developed similar approaches to the tolling
of statutory limitation periods. Most significantly, the New Jersey courts
developed the “discovery rule” in O’Keeffe v. Snyder.158 Under this

119, 121–23 & n.10 (1988–1989).
150. See Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural
Property in the U.S., 75 B.U. L. REV. 559, 570–71 (1995).
151. See LYNN NICHOLAS, THE RAPE OF EUROPA: THE FATE OF THE EUROPE’S TREASURES IN
THE THIRD REICH AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR 333 (1994) (examining the transfer of an
estimated four hundred tons of art and gold from Seigen mines during the Third Reich and Second
World War).
152. For a general discussion of the litigation surrounding Nazi-looted art, see generally
Jennifer Anglim Kreder, Reconciling Individual and Group Justice with the Need for Repose in
Nazi-Looted Art Disputes, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 155 (2007), which concluded that an international
tribune with compulsory jurisdiction to resolve Nazi-looted art disputes and clear title to the
artwork was a just solution to the increasing litigation involving Nazi-looted art, and David
Wissbroecker, Six Klimts, a Picasso and a Schiele: Recent Litigation Attempts to Recover Nazi
Stolen Art, 14 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 39 (2004).
153. Menzel v. List, 246 N.E.2d 742, 742–43 (N.Y. 1969).
154. Menzel v. List, 253 N.Y.S.2d 43, 44 (App. Div. 1964).
155. Id.
156. 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991).
157. Id. at 427.
158. 416 A.2d 862, 870 (N.J. 1980).
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approach, the cause of action does not accrue, and thus the statute of
limitations does not begin to run, until the original owner has discovered
the whereabouts of the stolen work, provided that she has used due
diligence in her search.159 The discovery rule was also followed in a case
involving Byzantine mosaics stolen from a Greek-Orthodox church in
Turkish-occupied Cyprus.160 The same rule inspired a statutory provision
in California dealing with the recovery of stolen art.161
In addition to these various judicial innovations, museums and
governments around the world have initiated policies to encourage—and
in some cases dictate—the return of looted art to its original owners.162 For
example, the American Association of Museums guidelines encourage
members to “waive certain available defenses” to claims for recovery of
once-looted art works in order to achieve an “equitable and appropriate
resolution of claims.”163 Many of these efforts occurred in the past decade
following a sensational standoff between the City of New York and an
Austrian art foundation over two Egon Schiele works stolen by the
Nazis.164 As a result of these efforts, an increasing number of looted works
continue to be returned to their pre-World War II owners.165 While these
developments are an important part of a larger reconciliation process with
Holocaust victims, it is important to note that they do contradict settled
law in both civil- and common-law jurisdictions.
The second major development concerns the return and protection of
the cultural property of indigenous peoples. The motivations behind these
repatriations are similar to those driving the return of Nazi-looted

159. Id.
160. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts,
Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1377–79, 1388 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
161. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(c) (West 2008) (stipulating that the cause of action for the
recovery of art and other related material does not accrue until the discovery of the whereabouts
of the work in question).
162. For a recent discussion of many of these initiatives, see Paulina McCarter Collins,
Comment, Has “The Lost Museum” Been Found? Declassification of Government Documents and
Report on Holocaust Assets Offer Real Opportunity to “Do Justice” for Holocaust Victims on the
Issue of Nazi-Looted Art, 54 ME. L. REV. 115, 140–50 (2002). For a look at one of these initiatives,
see Commission for Art Recovery, http://www.commartrecovery.org/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2009).
163. American Association of Museums, Guidelines Concerning the Unlawful Appropriation
of Objects During the Nazi Era, § 4(f) (amended Apr. 2001), available at http://www.aamus.org/museumresources/ethics/nazi_guidelines.cfm.
164. See Martha Lufkin, US Lawsuit to Confiscate Schiele’s Portrait of Wally Suspended, THE
ART NEWSPAPER, No. 193, Dec. 29, 2008, available at www.theartnewspaper.com/
article.asp?id=16693.
165. But see Jennifer Anglim Kreder, U.S. Museums’ Use of Declaratory Judgment Actions
in Nazi-Looted Art Disputes, ART, CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS AND HERITAGE LAW NEWSL. (Int’l Bar
Ass’n Legal Practice, Vienna, Austria), Oct. 2007, at 7, 7–8 (discussing pre-emptive approaches
by museums to secure title to disputed works of art).
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art—most notably, concerns about fairness, a desire to compensate for past
injustices, and collective guilt.166 The timing is also similar, with the
repatriation movement picking up steam throughout the world in just the
past few decades. Australia, New Zealand, and the United States all have
substantial laws dealing specifically with the cultural property of their
indigenous peoples.167 Canada has not relied on legislation, but
accomplishes repatriation through informal and voluntary mechanisms
similar to those that are now encouraging the return of Nazi-looted art.168
The primary U.S. legislation dealing with repatriations is the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA),169 which
requires federally funded museums to return cultural objects to culturally
affiliated tribes.170 Given that most cultural objects have been in the
possession of non-Native Americans for more than a century, here again
the idea of return runs counter to the law of personal property by ignoring
the relevant statute of limitations. NAGPRA specifically attempts to avoid
the issues generated by the background common law and limitations
periods by stipulating that museums do not need to return any objects for
which they can prove a “right of possession.” However, this “right of
possession” is itself narrowly defined.171 For this and other more politically
motivated reasons, museums have been cautious about utilizing the “right
of possession” defense, despite their lack of enthusiasm for NAGPRA.
Placing these changes in the context of the material above, we see
again the possibility of ownership interests extending beyond the
traditional temporal limitations imposed in property law. Changing
circumstances and our general intuition that claims weaken over time172
have provided adequate justification for extinguishing stale claims.
However, these reasons no longer seem to hold sway, at least in the areas
discussed above. While it might be tempting to marginalize this
development as just another example of the growing influence of human
rights in Western legal systems, these changes are also appearing in cases
that are removed from the troubling human rights contexts discussed
above. The O’Keeffe case in which the “discovery rule” was crafted had

166. See Sarah Harding, Justifying Repatriation of Native American Cultural Property, 72 IND.
L.J. 723, 738 (1997).
167. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 3005–3013 (2006) (providing for the return of cultural property
for indigenous people in certain situations).
168. Tamara Kagan, Recovering Aboriginal Cultural Property at Common Law: A Contextual
Approach, 63 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 1, 12–14 (2005).
169. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-601, 104 Stat.
3048 (1990) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3013 (2006)).
170. Id.
171. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3005(c), 3001(13); see Harding, supra note 166, at 736–37.
172. RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 138 (2000).
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nothing to do with Nazi atrocities or the misdeeds of colonialism.173 The
same point applies to the Byzantine mosaics case.174 The California law
mentioned above applies to all stolen articles “of historical, interpretive,
scientific, or artistic significance,”175 not simply those associated with
human rights violations.
Undoubtedly, these changes are connected to problems unique to the
art and cultural object market: the increasing importance of this market,
the emergence of a thriving black market, archaeological looting, cultural
misappropriation, and, more generally, the ease with which art objects can
be concealed. But these peculiarities should not divert our attention from
the temporal consequences—individuals or groups are able to reclaim
property long after their interests would have been terminated under
traditional common-law and legislative rules.
C. Conclusion
The five examples discussed above may seem isolated and random, but
they generate a few key observations. First, they stretch across all formal
categories of property law—real, personal, intellectual and cultural.
Customary rights and conservation easements are changes with respect to
land; changes to the running of limitation periods in reclaiming art and
cultural objects squarely fit within the law of personal or cultural property;
and the intellectual property changes speak for themselves. The rule
against perpetuities applies to most forms of non-vested property interests.
So while these examples might seem random, we should view them as
distinct niches in each area of property where long-term interests are
permitted to thrive.
Second, the changes regarding the conservation easement, the rule
against perpetuities, and the copyright term are significant. The increasing
number of acres subject to conservation easements is ample evidence of
the significance of this new form of environmental protection. In former
times the rule against perpetuities dominated the law of property. Its long
standing in the law has made it difficult to push aside; both its tenacity and
the extensive debate around its removal indicate that its withering is
anything but insignificant.
The changes to the copyright term, along with the broader growth of
intellectual property rights, are indisputably significant, giving rise to

173. See O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 864–65 (N.J. 1980) (explaining that O’Keeffe
alleged her paintings were stolen from a New York art gallery).
174. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts,
Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1379, 1388 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (stating that the mosaics went missing during
the Turkish invasion).
175. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(c) (West 2008).
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volumes of commentary and scholarship. Whether one bemoans or
applauds the increasing propertization of knowledge through, among other
mechanisms, term extensions, it is difficult to deny the significance of
intellectual property rights in the global economy. As Saul Levmore
remarked in an article on the future of property: “[O]f course it
is . . . ideas . . . which we can expect to come into play and to dominate our
economy—and interest group activity—in the future.”176
Third and finally, the temporal changes highlighted above have
occurred through both judicial and legislative innovation. The more
significant changes—those that have permitted property holders to extend
their claims further into the future—have been achieved through
legislation. But the innovative revival of customary rights, the
development of the public trust doctrine, and the inventive interpretations
of the tolling of limitation periods in disputes over cultural objects indicate
some openness on the part of the judiciary to tinker with temporal
limitations.
IV. TIME AND THE CHANGING CULTURAL LANDSCAPE OF PRIVATE
PROPERTY
A. Everything but Time
It is possible to come up with entirely separate, persuasive, and
contradictory explanations for each of these changes. But if we look at
these various developments through the lens of time, a pattern emerges
that deserves some attention. Within many discrete areas falling under the
broad umbrella of property law, private (or even quasi-public) property
holders are increasingly capable of maintaining interests in their property
for longer periods of time. While perpetual interests have been a deep
concern in property law for much of its history, we no longer seem to care
that much about them. In short, we seem less concerned about limiting
one’s control over or claim to property to a limited time frame.
In most of the examples above, the expanded time frame also
introduces more complexity and uncertainty into private property through
either permitting the long-term fragmentation of title, as in the case of the
conservation easement, or creating uncertainty about future and current
holdings, as in the case of the changes to the rule against perpetuities and
the recovery of stolen cultural property. While the lengthening of
intellectual property rights does not present the same concerns, the longterm monopolies created by such interests do create other well-

176. Saul Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path and Expanding Future, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 181,
194 (2003).
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documented efficiency problems. 177
These changes are all quite remarkable given the common law’s
traditional abhorrence of perpetual interests, not to mention its general
preference for rules that encourage efficient use of property. So why are
we suddenly more willing to accept perpetual and longer-running property
interests?
1. Rent Seeking
One plausible explanation for increasing temporal permissiveness can
be found in a “skeptical”178 law and economics story. This approach might
explain these changes as the products of classic rent-seeking behavior, the
type ubiquitous in the evolution of property rights. Accordingly, temporal
changes might result from individuals seeking profits or advantages
associated with the use and control of property—advantages that tend to
diminish society’s net social wealth. After all, individuals have always
desired perpetual interests in property,179 and historically the courts and
legislatures limited such behavior by establishing various temporal and
conceptual boundaries.180 In the various examples discussed above,
rent-seeking works through an official change in the rules, rather than
working within established rules, as would be the case of a holdout.181 So
in addition to the rent-seeking behavior, this explanation also requires
hypothesizing capture of the legislative or judicial process by the rentseeking individuals.182
This explanation may be convincing if we focus on the general
trend—individuals seeking greater control of their property over time. But
when we look closely at the examples it doesn’t always fit. Certainly
rent-seeking behavior is a plausible explanation for the changes to the rule

177. Brief for Eldred et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Eldred v. Ahscroft, 537
U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), 2002 WL 1041846, at *8.
178. Levmore, supra note 176, at 182–83.
179. For a look at the persistent rent seeking of copyright and patent holders attempting to
secure perpetual rights, see Edward C. Walterscheid, supra note 110, at 334–40, 368–71.
180. Although early in the development of copyright, Lord Mansfield suggested that there was
a perpetual property right based on the common law, a right that, if it truly existed, was restrained
by legislation, not the courts. See id. at 334–46 (discussing this history of the development of the
first English copyright statute, the Statute of Anne 1710, and subsequent debate over its
interpretation and background rights).
181. For a brief discussion of rent seeking both within the established rules and with the intent
of changing rules, see Thomas W. Merrill, Rent Seeking and the Compensation Principle, 80 NW.
U. L. REV. 1561, 1586–87 (1986); for a more general discussion, see James M. Buchanan, Rent
Seeking and Profit Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 3, 3–15 (James
M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980).
182. See Peter Drahos, Regulating Property: Problems of Efficiency and Regulating Capture,
in REGULATING LAW 168, 168–69 (Christine Parker et al. eds., 2004).
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against perpetuities183 and the lengthening terms in intellectual property
rights. Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite convincingly argue that this
explanation is the most compelling for the general expansion of
intellectual property rights in international law.184 But it is less persuasive
when we turn to the other examples where profit-driven or self-interested
motives don’t always provide the most convincing explanation. The
conservation easement, for example, presents the possibility of an
interesting mix of selfish and selfless motivations, with tax advantages
weighing in on one side and long-term environmental concerns on the
other. Thomas Merrill argues that this kind of legislation is “not easily
placed under either the private-interest or the public-interest model, but
rather reflects widely shared moral or cultural sentiments.”185
The new rules regarding repatriation of cultural objects are equally
complicated. While on the one hand they can be understood as the triumph
of highly specified self-interested groups, on the other the motivations here
are best understood in human rights or corrective justice terms, not profits.
In short, not all changes have been driven by profit-hungry individuals
desiring to make the most of their property without concern for the broader
social impact.
2. Efficiency
The flip side of this “skeptical” rent-seeking story is the “optimistic”
economic story, developed most prominently by Harold Demsetz in his
immensely influential Toward a Theory of Property Rights.186 According
to Demsetz, as the costs and benefits associated with a specific resource
change, property rights develop or change to produce the most efficient
outcomes, either in terms of incentive and production or reduction of
transaction costs.187 This story is one of many, for example, that
intellectual property rights holders rely on to justify their expanding rights,
including term extensions. According to these rights holders, changes in
technology and the growing cost of research require longer-lasting
intellectual property rights to maintain the optimal balance between
creation incentives and public access.188 Indeed, according to Carol Rose,

183. See Dobris, supra note 70, at 639–41 (arguing that while the Rule was intended to benefit
society over and above the preferences of individual landowners, its demise is part and parcel of
our lack of interest in civil society and public life).
184. See DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 104, at 73.
185. Merrill, supra note 181, at 1587.
186. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 354
(1967).
187. Id. at 350.
188. Many are unconvinced, however, that, at least in the area of copyright, longer-lasting
rights have any real impact on the incentive to create. See Brief for Eldred et al. as Amici Curiae
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it can be used plausibly to justify any of the changes, including the rise of
customary rights. Customary rights fit within a group of resources cleverly
labeled comedic rather than tragic commons that become more valuable
when more people have access to them—“‘the more, the merrier.’”189
If we are going to rely on this justification for changing temporal
limitations, then we need to know what has changed so that longer-running
property interests are now more efficient because historically the
assumption has been quite the opposite. Indeed, as discussed in the above
section on time and property, a recent wave of articles on the numerus
clausus principle has pointed to a raft of efficiency-related arguments for
the existing temporal and conceptual limitations in property.190 More than
two decades ago, Robert Ellickson provided convincing efficiency-based
justifications for the rule against perpetuities, and the rules allowing for
the termination of servitudes, and shorter, not longer, limitation periods for
adverse possession claims.191
If efficiency requires that property remain flexible to enable
appropriate responses to inevitable but unidentifiable changes in market
conditions, why are we witnessing the rise of temporally unlimited
property interests? If anything, the pace of change in our current social and
economic conditions would seem to dictate shorter-running property
interests. In short, either the efficiency argument simply can’t provide a
compelling explanation for these temporal changes, or we need a richer
analysis of the effects of the quickening pace of change to provide the
contextual framework for a convincing efficiency-related argument.
3. Neo-liberalism
A more persuasive explanation might be found in the rise of neoliberalism. Given that most of the temporal changes discussed, in
particular those that allow perpetual interests to run into the future, can be
understood as expansions of property rights, we could think of these
changes as part of the swing away from Keynesian economics (until we hit
the current economic crisis) and toward greater reliance on the market and
private mechanisms of control. Under such a theory, there is a presumption
against any rules that interfere with ownership or create restraints on
alienation—including temporal limitations. Richard Epstein is arguably

Supporting Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), 2002 WL 1041846,
at *8.
189. ROSE, supra note 24, at 141. Economists also refer to this phenomenon as “network
effects.”
190. See supra notes 39–44 and accompanying text.
191. However, Ellickson focuses on the adverse possession of land, not chattels. Robert C.
Ellickson, Adverse Possession and Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in the Libertarian Model of
Property Rights, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 723, 734–36 (1986).
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one of the best-known advocates of a neo-liberal theory of property
rights,192 and so it should come as no surprise that he has argued against
some of the temporal limitations in property law.
In a now somewhat dated but strikingly relevant article, Epstein argues
that the only justification for interfering with “restraints of private
alienation is to prevent the infliction of external harms.”193 Since,
according to Epstein, “[t]he rule against perpetuities and its kindred rules
are not directed” to such harms, they serve no legitimate function.194 In
short, Epstein argues for temporally unrestrained ownership rights, at least
with respect to attempts to control property into the future.
Whatever one thinks of the normative argument here, this explanation
at least complements other current trends in property law. In this sense we
can understand the temporal changes as yet another aspect of our steady
move away from a centralized, “command and control” model of resource
regulation to rising confidence in an unrestrained system of private
property.195 This trend is evident in everything from the privatization of
world economies to the rise of gated communities196 and the emergence of
market-based private property solutions to resources formally considered
public goods, such as clean air.197 This explanation, like the “optimistic”
economic story, sees the decreasing significance of temporal limitations
as an intentional and desirable development rather than just a case of the
fox guarding the hen house. But unlike the efficiency justification,
unfettered private ownership under this approach is presumed to be more
than just productive. Private ownership is seen as inherently more
desirable because it is a fundamental element of one’s right to property.
This strong rights-based argument certainly is persuasive with respect
to the first three changes discussed. But does it also work for the changes
in the areas of adverse possession of cultural objects and the re-emergence
of customary rights? Epstein argues in favor of the rule of adverse
possession, including a standard application of limitation periods,198 so if
he is consistent, then the changes in this area don’t seem to fit. But

192. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (critiquing the expansion of the power of eminent domain).
193. Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property,
64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 705 (1986).
194. Id.
195. Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales,
Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 130 (1998); see also GIDDENS, supra note
48, at 164.
196. See generally EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS AND THE
RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT (1996) (examining the political and social
implications of the growth of homeowner associations).
197. Rose, supra note 195, at 130.
198. Epstein, supra note 193, at 679–82.
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Epstein’s arguments in this area are in predominantly utilitarian terms, a
theoretical shift for which he was roundly criticized.199 If we stick with the
neo-liberal approach, the rights of an original property-holder arguably
take priority over all subsequent claims regardless of the concerns about
efficiency or certainty that are addressed by limitation periods destroying
a right of recovery.200 In other words, while these changes can, on the one
hand, seem strikingly redistributive and, as such, sit uncomfortably with
the neo-liberal justification, they can also be understood in terms of strong
persistent property rights and thus more in keeping with the neo-liberal
approach.201
But even if we settle on this explanation we are still left with the
nagging question: Why have these absolutist tendencies with respect to
property rights materialized in the areas discussed?
4. Certainty, Fairness, and the Changing Face of Property
There are several other ideas we could explore. Perhaps the changes
reflect the simple reality that people live longer, or maybe the general
decline in the significance of tangible property in a global economy.202 We
live in an information society, dependent on intangible rather than tangible
199. See Ellickson, supra note 191, at 725.
200. Indeed there is some movement in this direction with respect to the adverse possession
of real property. In 2005, the European Court of Human Rights held that the law of adverse
possession in the United Kingdom violated the protection of property found in the European
Convention on Human Rights. J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom, 02 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005).
The case involved a simple case of adverse possession with the usual mix of common-law elements
and a statutory limitation period. Id. The Court concluded that the transfer of property without
compensation to the adverse possessor violated the plaintiff’s right to “peaceful enjoyment of his
possessions.” Id. The decision was, however, overturned by the Grand Chamber of the European
Court of Human Rights by a vote of ten to seven. J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom,
44302/02 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007). Public outcry at the effects of adverse possession in the United
States have also led numerous states to propose changes to the law of adverse possession, in some
cases prohibiting it all together. See Jay Romano, Adverse Possession: Mind Your Property, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 11, 2007, § 11, at 12; Heath Urie, Adverse Possession Bill Set for Senate Committee,
BOULDER DAILY CAMERA, Mar. 4, 2008, available at http://www.dailycamera.com/news/2008/mar/
04/adverse-possession-bill-set-senate-committee/.
201. However, Epstein has argued that long-standing public rights in property are equally
worthy of defense against the onslaught of legislation that might alter them without compensation.
So, for example, Epstein rejects the extension of the copyright term as a legislative intrusion on
existing public rights. See Richard A. Epstein, The Dubious Constitutionality of the Copyright Term
Extension Act, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 123, 127–28 (2002); Richard A. Epstein, Congress’ Copyright
Giveaway, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 1998, at A19.
202. DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 104, at 198–99 (“[W]ealth . . . com[es] from
controlling abstract objects . . . .”); Gregory S. Alexander, Time and Property in the American
Republican Legal Culture, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 273, 333–35 (1991) (discussing the rise of “imaginary
property” or intangibles); Heller, supra note 2, at 1174 (tangible property at the core of property
conceptions but the locus of economic value has shifted to intangibles).
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assets.203 If tangible property is unimportant, the rules established to ensure
socially beneficial uses will presumably also be less important. Setting
aside the intellectual property material, some changes involve rather
remote examples of tangible property that arguably have little to do with
the economy and public welfare. Even the rule against perpetuities, with
its roots in an era when land was the core of social and economic life,204
is typically associated with land rather than the diverse types of property
interests to which it actually applies.205 But this doesn’t explain why
intellectual property rights are also getting longer. If everything turns on
what is relevant to the growing global economy and we accept the
economic arguments for temporal limitations, perhaps intellectual property
rights should be getting shorter, or at least not expanding.
Perhaps all these changes are simply part of the cyclical movement in
property between clear or “crystal” rules, devoted to creating certain and
definitive property rights, and fuzzy or “mud” rules whose purpose is to
inject an element of fairness.206 Since temporal changes tend to create
greater uncertainty, could these rules simply reflect the mud or fairness
part of the cycle? If so, can we expect these changes to encourage a new
set of doctrines that re-impose clarity and more precise time frames for
control over property? While we may witness a swing back to the
enforcement of temporal limitations, I am not sure the “mud” explanation
is entirely adequate in this context. Not all the rule changes discussed
above, particularly the changes to the rule against perpetuities and
intellectual property rights, are fuzzy, mud kind of rules. To the contrary,
these changes simplify the rules of the game, arguably bringing more
certainty to a viable property interest even if, as in the case of the rule
against perpetuities, simultaneously encouraging greater fragmentation of
those interests over time.
So far this Article has presented a rather eclectic selection of possible
explanations, both normative and descriptive, for the slow disappearance
of some temporal boundaries. All the ideas presented above are worthy of
further discussion and are potential candidates for both exploring and
critiquing temporal changes. Some combination of these explanations may
be the most convincing line of inquiry. But each of these approaches
203. R.T. Narayanan, Intangibles are the Tangible Assets Now, BUSINESS LINE (THE HINDU),
Dec. 28, 2005, at 11, 11, available at http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2005/12/28/stories/200
5122800251100.htm.
204. George L. Haskins, Extending the Grasp of the Dead Hand: Reflections on the Origins
of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 19, 20–22, 27 (1977).
205. See Dobris, supra note 70, at 635–39.
206. Carol Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 577–80 (1988)
(arguing that both types of rules are present in property law and in fact tend to appear in cyclical
fashion, reflecting two important, yet not wholly compatible, cultural tendencies in the maintenance
of a system of private property—desire for certainty on the one hand and fairness on the other).
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suffers from at least one significant shortcoming. Each one of them fails
to deal directly with the temporal element. In each of the above
justifications, temporal limitations and their removal are secondary issues,
simply by-products of larger normative theories or social expectations. In
short, time wouldn’t matter much if we were to pursue any of the above
ideas. But if we take seriously the growing acceptance of perpetual
property and Greenhouse’s observations about the importance of time in
legitimizing law,207 then curiosity compels a search for an explanation that
takes the temporal element seriously.
This doesn’t mean that the above explanations are irrelevant. To the
contrary, temporal limitations appeared because of their tendency to
encourage efficient and fair uses of property, not out of opposition to
perpetuities per se.208 And so it may very well be the case that these same
reasons have, in conjunction with changing cultural assumptions about
property, prompted the removal of such limitations. But it is indeed the
changing cultural assumptions about some forms of property—how we
define fairness and expectations through time—that is worth exploring.
B. Time, Stability, and the Subjective Element in Property
The new value placed on the transitory, the elusive, and
the ephemeral, the very celebration of dynamism, discloses a
longing for an undefiled, immaculate, and stable present.209
The circumstances that created our current market-driven system of
private property and the temporal boundaries accompanying it have not
changed dramatically. In particular, the demands of social, commercial,
and private life shift so rapidly today that we would expect even more
limited temporal boundaries in the ownership of property. The prevailing
conditions of society even a single generation into the future are likely to
be so different from today that long-term control of property seems
anachronistic. Julia Mahoney captures this point in her discussion of the
conservation easement: “[T]here is a certain irony in the fact that the
number of acres under conservation easement has been growing rapidly at
a time when old conceptual models of natural and cultural stability have
begun to give way to more dynamic ones.”210 Why do we strive for greater

207. Greenhouse, supra note 8, at 1642–43.
208. See, e.g., Lewis M. Simes, The Policy Against Perpetuities, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 707,
707–13 (1955).
209. Jurgen Habermas, Modernity—An Incomplete Project, in P OSTMODERN CULTURE 3, 5
(Hal Foster ed., 1985).
210. Mahoney, supra note 86, at 753; see also Alex Geisinger, Rethinking Risk-Based
Environmental Cleanup, 76 IND. L.J. 367, 368–69 (2001) (critiquing the “new cleanup paradigm”
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permanence and long-arm control over property when our current cultural
conditions require greater flexibility? How is it that in an era of rapid
technological change we are more willing to tolerate perpetual interests?
If we put the notion of time front and center, what becomes obvious is
that the temporal expansion of interests in property has occurred in the
context of broader social conditions, which David Harvey has termed
“‘time space compression.’”211 Harvey uses this concept to elaborate on
changes in how we represent the world to ourselves.212 At its core,
time-space compression simply articulates the rapid acceleration of the
pace of life and the corresponding shrinking of space. Spatial barriers
disappear as goods, information, and people move rapidly from place to
place.213 Revolutionary changes in transportation and communication
technologies have radically reduced both spatial and temporal horizons.214
These changes are most apparent in the flow of capital and the
globalization of markets, but their effects are wide-ranging. The most
evident consequence “has been to accentuate volatility and
ephemerality”215 in every aspect of life—the notion that “‘all that is solid
melts into air’ has rarely been more pervasive.”216 Actual tangible things
pass through our hands with amazing speed, generating labels such as the
“throwaway” or “disposable” society.217 These observations are hard to
reconcile with the changes in property law discussed above, but the
transitory nature of current social conditions is only part of the story.
Harvey goes on to state:
But, as so often happens, the plunge into the maelstrom of
ephemerality has provoked an explosion of opposed
sentiments and tendencies. . . . The revival of interest in basic
institutions (such as the family and community), and the
search for historical roots are all signs of a search for more
secure moorings and longer-lasting values in a shifting
world.218

that restricts property use by predicting and then entrenching future property uses); A. Dan Tarlock,
Slouching Toward Eden: The Eco-Pragmatic Challenges of Ecosystem Revival, 87 MINN. L. REV.
1173, 1175–78 (2003) (discussing the changing approaches to environmental protection, in
particular, the shift from a focus on preservation to revival).
211. DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITIONS OF POSTMODERNITY: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS
OF CULTURAL CHANGE 240 (1989).
212. Id.
213. See id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 285.
216. Id. at 285–86.
217. Id. at 286.
218. Id. at 292.
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We might find fertile ground in this oppositional tendency for
exploring temporal changes in property. Our increased tolerance for
perpetual property interests might reflect our desire for stability,
permanence, and historical continuity when such things are scarce in other
aspects of our lives. As Susan Stewart notes, within cultures defined by an
exchange economy, saturated with fungible commodities, the search for
something authentic and unchanging becomes critical.219
This explanation is strengthened when we take another look at the areas
where the temporal changes have occurred. Each of the areas discussed
concerns either institutions or actual objects to which we tend to attach
added personal, cultural, or communal significance. The clearest example
of this is in the area of cultural property. The cases and statutes are full of
comments about preserving the past and protecting sacred connections. As
Harvey recognizes, certain objects “become the focus of a contemplative
memory, and hence a generator of a sense of self that lies outside the
sensory overloading of consumerist culture and fashion.”220 Thus we have
the meteoric rise of the market in art and collectibles; this has been a
reliable place to “store value effectively.”221 We can even consider the
conservation easement as a reflection of our desire for permanence, an
“undefiled, immaculate and stable present.”222
The idea that our concerns about protecting the past and preserving our
place in the future become more intense during times of technological
change is not just a product of our current conditions. Stephen Kern writes
about similar experiences in an earlier generation: “From . . . 1880 to the
outbreak of World War I a series of sweeping changes in technology and
culture created distinctive new modes of thinking about and experiencing
time and space.”223 This generation looked to the past “for stability in the
face of rapid technological, cultural, and social change.”224 During this
time, England, France, and Germany all passed legislation creating
organizations such as the National Trust “to look after places of historic
interest or natural beauty.” 225
The temporal changes in intellectual property can also be viewed in this
light—but admittedly only indirectly. On the one hand, the changes to the
copyright term seem to be about profits, whether rent-seeking or efficient,
and the need to harmonize U.S. law with the European copyright term for

219. SUSAN STEWART, ON LONGING: NARRATIVES OF THE MINIATURE, THE GIGANTIC, THE
SOUVENIR, THE COLLECTION 133 (1984).
220. HARVEY, supra note 211, at 292.
221. Id. at 298.
222. Habermas, supra note 209, at 5.
223. STEPHEN KERN, THE CULTURE OF TIME AND SPACE 1880–1918 1 (1983).
224. Id. at 36.
225. Id. at 39.
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profit-motivated reasons.226 And yet it was arguments about the sanctity of
the creative product, the preservation of cultural heritage, and the
importance of protecting the expectations of heirs that tended to pave the
way for expansion.227 Disney was perhaps the most vocal special interest
advocate of the CTEA, and yet its prominence in the debate over such
legislation did not focus on profits but rather concerns about defiling those
quintessential American cultural icons, Mickey and Minnie. 228
Despite the many situations governed by the rule against perpetuities,
its primary association is with the testator who wants only to see that his
lifelong efforts are not squandered and that those he loves are well cared
for.229 It is fundamentally about ties to family and community—those
institutions, according to Harvey, that we are striving to reinvigorate.230
The purpose of dead hand control is to maintain some presence among kin
long after all physical traces have disappeared.231
In short, a plausible explanation for the disappearance of time
limitations is a shared desire for permanence and preservation in areas
where property is perceived as being important to personal and cultural
identity. Because of this perception we let our guard down and ignore the
significance of boundaries implemented to protect broader social interests.
We are eager to buy into the story of the struggling creator, the patriarch
who just wants to care for his family, the victims of ethnic and cultural
genocide wanting to reclaim something of their own, and the
environmentalist or public advocate looking to preserve the past for future
generations—because they resonate with our personal experiences and our
desire for stability.
If property law has been shaped by both subjective preferences and
objective rules based on broader concerns about social utility, we might

226. Arthur R. Miller, Commentary, Extending Copyrights Preserves U.S. Culture,
BILLBOARD, Jan. 14, 1995, at 4.
227. See Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 483 Before the S. Comm. On
the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 42 (1995) (statement of Jack Valenti, President & CEO, Motion Picture
Assoc.) (“A public domain work is an orphan. No one is responsible for its life. But everyone
exploits its use, until that time certain when it becomes soiled and haggard, barren of its previous
virtues.”); Miller, supra note 226; see also S. REP. NO. 104-315, § 3 (1996) (detailing concerns
about incentives for creativity and protecting claims for iconic works still popular and profitable).
228. Rarely is there a mention of the CTEA in the popular media without reference to the
expiration of copyrights on Mickey Mouse and his friends. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices
to Review Copyright Extension, N.Y.TIMES, Feb. 20, 2002, at C1 (mentioning the concern about
Mickey Mouse entering into the public domain). For more material see the documents and articles
referenced at Commentary on Copyright Term Extension, http://homepages.law.asu.edu/~dkarjala/
OpposingCopyrightExtension/commentary.html and Legsliative Materials (105th Congress),
http://homepages.law.asu.edu/~dkarjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/legislative.html.
229. Haskins, supra note 204, at 25.
230. See HARVEY, supra note 211, at 292.
231. See id.
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see the changes discussed as leaning toward the subjective preference side
of the equation. While it is plausible that this leaning stems from a belief
in the sanctity and absolute nature of property rights,232 it is equally likely
that such changes simply reflect our yearning for enclaves of stability in
the midst of ceaseless flux. Furthermore, this approach, unlike the
neo-liberal claims, helps explain the discrete nature of the temporal
changes. While Epstein’s approach would apply to all property interests,233
the arguments presented here explain only the limited areas discussed
above or other areas where we might recognize a significant cultural or
personal element—areas where it makes sense to seek greater permanence
and stability.
There are two important points to clarify. First, I am not arguing that
a desire for stability in these areas is a primary or first-order reason for the
temporal changes discussed. As I have stated many times throughout this
Article, there are other more direct and compelling reasons. But the
subjective component here may be at least a partial influence, something
that provides an additional justification for the changes, or a reason to
minimize or limit our objections to otherwise obvious and blatant rent
seeking.
Second, I am not arguing that these changes actually create stability.
While they may be indirectly connected to a yearning or desire for stability
in certain areas where a subjective element looms large, the changes do not
necessarily achieve this desired result. In the cultural property context,
other connections that are deemed less worthy are cut short, customary
rights interfere with the stability of private landowners, and conservation
easements fragment property interests over time. Certainly there are
winners and losers in all property allocations and while the changes may
reflect at some level the importance of subjective connections, they
simultaneously minimize and destabilize other connections whether in the
public or other private interests. Our collective consensus about how we
allocate property rights is bound to privilege some connections over
others. My argument here is that part of that collective consensus, part of
what might explain the shifts in entitlements that are accomplished
through adjustments to temporal limitations, might be reflected in what
Harvey recognizes as a collective yearning for creating new pockets of
stability.
Emphasis on the subjective element of ownership, the importance of
imagination, and psychological attachments, have been key elements in
property theory going back at least to Hume, who stressed the importance
of conventions in the construction of property rules.234 More recently,
232. See supra Part III.A.3.
233. Id.
234. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE 536–65 (Ernest C. Mossner ed., Penguin
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Erving Goffman’s work showing that even under conditions of the starkest
deprivation we strive to create property—enclaves of privacy and stable
presence—often appears in discussions of property.235 Margaret Radin is
probably the scholar most responsible for reinvigorating this aspect of
property, drawing out the personality element in property and the
importance of this element in the construction of legal rules.236 More
recently, Peter Benson argues for a subjective, “self-authenticating”
element in principles of first occupancy.237
Returning to Greenhouse’s observation about time and law, we might
say that the shift toward perpetual property reflects the “out of time”
aspect of law—a desire for constancy rather than the excessive flux
embedded in current conditions of the linear story.238 Surely the linear
story is still predominant in property law. The notion of private property
is fundamentally connected to our cultural obsession with progress,
growth, and economic development. But integral to the mythic status of
law and property is the idea that there is always a permanent, unchanging,
and impenetrable entitlement.
While a focus on the subjective element in property is common, I have
used it primarily as a descriptive tool, leaving the larger normative
questions untouched. It is presented here as a plausible alternative to the
other strong contender for understanding these temporal changes, the one
suggested by Richard Epstein and actually argued for in temporal terms
almost twenty years ago. While Epstein’s approach would apply to all
property interests, the arguments presented here help explain only the
discrete areas discussed above. The recognition of a perpetual property
category whose perceived function is to provide greater security in an
ever-changing world is arguably problematic, not to mention easily coopted by rent seekers. But as a reflection of the larger social and cultural
responses to our current societal conditions, it seems inevitable and worthy
of further attention.
V. CONCLUSION
Legally cognizable property rights are culturally contingent. Both the
scope and breadth of property rights have changed over time, driven by the

Books 1969) (1740).
235. Erving Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other
Inmates, reprinted in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW, at 3, 5 (Robert C. Ellickson et al. eds., 2d
ed. 1995).
236. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957–61, 986–88
(1982).
237. Peter Benson, Philosophy of Property Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 752 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002).
238. See supra Part I.A.
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shifting needs and desires of individuals within society as well as the
erosion of some resources and the discovery of others. Ownership claims
to property have been temporally circumscribed because such limitations
were necessary in agrarian and commercial societies, but also because the
temporal boundaries legitimized the institution of private property in
socially cognizable terms. Such temporal boundaries reflected the limits
of fairness and effective management of resources over time. In many
ways, these temporal limitations are more significant than ever, and they
persist in important ways. But with the rapid pace of change and constant
state of flux in our current social conditions comes the possibility of
changing temporal limitations in areas where we might logically seek
refuge from the dizzy pace of life. Anthony Giddens remarks, “Where
tradition lapses, and lifestyle choice prevails, the self isn’t exempt. Selfidentity has to be created and recreated on a more active basis than
before.”239 It is in this desire to recreate something personal, meaningful,
and lasting that we might find the cultural legitimation of perpetual
property.

239. ANTHONY GIDDENS, RUNAWAY WORLD 65 (2000).
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